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THE

SUPRi~XE
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COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----~-----

!lO\JARD V. DRAKE: ,

)

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent,)
Case lfo. 15162

)

vs.

)
)

PAT CLARK,

)
)

Defendant and Appellant. )

______________ )
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'l

STATEMENT OF

KI~D

OF CASE

The action filed by the Plaintiff against the
Defendant, in its First Cause of Action, alleges the existence
of a partnership between Plaintiff and Defendant, and demands
an accounting.

T~e

Second Cause of Action sounds in frauds;

the Third Cause of Action seeks unpaid wages due to Plaintiff
from Jefendant; the Fourth Cause of Action sounds in unjust
enrichment; while the Fifth Cause of Action is one for
rcplevin.

The matter is before the Supreme Court on interlocu-

tory appeal, the appeal being brought by Defendant, who
clai;;is error in the Order of the lower court.
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COUR'l'
The fifth Judicial District Court for \Vashington
County denied !)efendant' s "Notion to Quash Service of Process
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~

\

I
and to Order Jisrniss;1l

o[

t:omnL1inL
;ind First:\
r
- 1 r:-1cncic'd Cc-·

finding that failure to properly serve sun:>1•ons upon
within one ycJr of the Jal(' of fLlin;', Lhc Cc·r.1plain:_
J·urisdictionJl in nJture, \.'l1l.'rc ikfl'ndanL was cva d'ing 0 ~.

of process.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON /\PPEi\L
----------~~---------~~

Defendant and /\ppellant CLARK seek:; n•vcr:oal o'.
the lower court's Order.

PlainLif[ and Rc>spondc11t seeks.

affirmation of the same Order.
STATEMEl~T

OF FACTS

On or about 23 January 1976, process was sent t:

Court of Washington County, naming CLARK as Oef~ndailt (?,,
1).

CLARK

'vfoS

scrvcci with process in Las Vegas, iievadd,,

27 January 1976 (R. 11).

The serving officer failed to

endorse on the copy of the summons delivered co Ci.,AKK chc
date of service or Lhe serving offict.or' s signature: (R l1'
On 17 February 1976, vefendcmt CLAt<.K filed a "Motion to
Quash Service of Process" (O{.

12-15).

On 23 .february 19i,

process was again sent Lo the Clark County Sheriff to re·
serve PAT CLARK, but the summons sent for :;l!cvice lacked

1

time in which answer was required (R. 19).
0'1 L3 M2y 1976, i)cft.ondant CLi\Rl<.
with process (iZ. 18).

CLM~i<. filed a :.JoL

1·1c1s

i_o11

t:c

again serw'
Qudsh Josee
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upon the L1ct that the summons failed to set forth the
number of days in which he had to answer the Complaint (R.

20).

Service was quashed by order of the lower

co~rt

on 17

June 1976 (R. 24).
0;:-i 3 December 1976, Plaintiff, as a matter of
right, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 15, filed his First Amended
Complaint (R. 25).
CLARK was served with a copy of the First Anended
Complaint and summons on 11 February 1977, in Las Vegas,
Nevada (R. 3Lf).

On 9 March 1977, CLARK filed a "Motion to

Quash Service of Process and to Order Dismissal of Complaint
and First Amccnded Complaint" (R. 36).

Th'is motion was heard

on 11 April 1977, and was overrul2d and denied.

CLARK was

given 20 days in uhich to answer the First Amended Complaint

(R. 44).

A written order to that effect was signed on 25

April 1977 (R. 45).
Other than the 3 instances of service upon Defendant
CLARK, the record shows 16 other visits by nembers of the
Clark County ShC'riff' s Department to Defendant

CLAR~('

s home

and place of business, and at least one visit by the Washington
County Sheriff to Defendant's ranch in Utah, all in effort
to serve Defendant CLARK.

The record also shows numerous

attempts by counsel for Plaintiff to get the United States
Marshal and private process servers to accomplish service
(R. 38-42).
JC' fondant CLAIUZ now appeals the order of the
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District Court overruling ;111d denying hi:;

"~·lotion

to Quas

0

Service of Process and to Order Dismissal of Complaint a"d
First Amended Complaint".

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFE;~DANT' S "MOTION TO QLlASH SERVICE OF
PROCESS AND TO ORDER DISi'!ISSAL OF COi!PLAim
A;'lD FIRST AMENDED C0:-1PLAINT" FOR Tl!E REASONS
Tl!AT (1) DEFENDAi~T CLARK WAS PROPERLY St::RVED
WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY LAH, (2) THE
PROVISION OF U.R.C.P. 4(b) APPLICABLE llERE
IS NOT JURISDIC'iIONAL BU'1 PROCEDURAL HJ
NATURE, Ai'JD (3) DH:t::~DANT CLARK BY RC:ASON
OF HIS CONDUCT IN EVADING SERVICE OF PROCESS
CAl'li'lOT NOW BE HEARD TO Cot!PLAHI CONCERlHi~G
THE TH1E REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH SERVICE uro;~

Hrn.

U.R.C.P. 4(b) states:
"If an action is commenced by the filiDs of J
co1,1plaint, summons must issue t:lwreon \>lithin
tlirc'c 1.10nths from the date of filin;;. The surn:"o:.
rw1:-: 1: ht2 served wiLhin one year afLer thL'. filirig
of the complaint or the action will be d~em~
dismissed, provided that in any action brought
aga i.nst two or more defendants in which personal
service has been obtained upon one of them withir
the year, the other or others may be served or
appcar at any time before trial."
( 1)

D::: fendan t CLARK claims thil t because Pl ainti::

amended his complaint and issued summons on 1 December 19;:,,
which complaint and summons were served upon Defendant

c;x:

on 11 February 1977, that the service should be quashed,
based upon the wording of U. R. C. P. 4 (b) .

I t is clear that

the wording of the rule does not support Def211dant 's claim.
The rule provitles that the summons must issue within
filonths of the date of filing of the compLtint.

The record
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before the court shows that a summons did in fact issue
within 3 months from the date of the filing of the complaint.
The wording of the rule also provides that a summons raust be
served within 1 year after the filing of the complaint, and
Defendant claims that this wording is a basis for quashal
and dismissal.

If the court were to adopt Defendant's

contention, it would be ruling that no complaint could ever
be amended if it were to be amended in such a manner that the
amended complaint could not be served within 1 year of the
filing of the complaint.

This is clearly beyond the meaning

or the intent of U.R.C.P. 4(b).
It is obvious from the wording of U.R.C.P. 4(b)
that the Utah Supreme Court, in adopting the rule, merely
r.icant to prevent a dilatory plaintiff from allowing an
action to lie al rest without proceeding upon the same.

In

this case, the record shows in excess of 20 attempts to
accomplish service upon Jefendant, and shows that the entire
year following the filing of the original complaint was
spent in diligent effort by Plaintiff attempting to serve
Defendant CLAP.K, who has patently attempted to evade service
of process upon him, in derogation of the dignity and authority
of the courts of the State of Utah.

Equity, justice and

good sense dictate that U.R.C.P. 4(b) not be interpreted to
bar a diligent plaintiff.
Further, Plaintiff having amended his complaint on
3 December 1976 to show Defendant's correct county of residence,
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I
it was physically impossible to issue a summons to
•

.
1 equ1r.

Defendant to appear and answer such First Amended Cor ,

~p '<ll"

before the amendment took place.

Defendant's col
n ·cntiun,

logically, would require that Plaintiff issue a summons
first amended complaint prior to knowing that there
need to amend the complaint.

1" 15 ,

A proper interpretation ot

U.R.C.P. 4(b) would be to read it as follows,

underli~~

words being added to the text of the rule:
"If an action is amended by the filing of
an amended compL1inr,-summons must issue
thcrcoi1WTthin three months from the date of
such filing.
The: summons r;iust be servc:d
within one year after the filing of the
amc:nded complaint or the action will be
Cicemed-dismissed, providc:rl that in CJny
action brought against two or more defc11dants
in which pc:rsonal service has been obtained
L1pon one of thc:m within the year, the other
or others may be served or appear ;:it any time
before trial."

,
)

Underlined words added to show proper .interprekj
I

of U.R.C.P. 4(b).
Since sunm1ons issued within 3 months of the fib
of the First Amended Complaint, <.md since service of such
summons and first AiJ1ended Complaint occurred within 1 year
of the filing of the First ./\mended Complaint, service upoi,
Defendant CLARK was timely.
(2)

i

Defendant CLARK claims that the provision o: I

U.R.C.P. 4(b) here applicable is jurisdictional in nature.
Such is not the case.

.i\lthough this court has in so~

instances deemed other provisions of U.R.C:.P. L1(b) to be
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jurisdictional in nature, a reading of all such cases clearly
shows that such holdings were based upon the failure of the
plaintiffs in those cases to diligently pursue the various
actions ruled upon.

In this case, Plaintiff has been more

than diligent in his efforts to obtain service of process
upon Defendant CLARK, and the length of time required to
serve Defenciant CLARK was the direct result of CLARK's
evasion of service of process, and not any delay on the part
of Plaintiff.
Further, the wording of U.R.C.P. 4(b) shows that
this court did not intend to mandatorily dismiss an action
where service upon a defendant was

accom~lished

year following the filing of the complaint.

T~e

more than 1
wording is

that the action "will be deemed dismissed", not that the
action "shall be dismissed".

There are no cases interpreting

the wording quoted, and there is no similar federal rule to
which we might look for further interpretation.

However,

upon its face, the use of the words "will be deemed" seems
to suggest that the Clerk of a trial court may merely deem
the action dismissed for his record keeping purposes.

Such

ruling would favor the hearing of an action upon its merits,
rather than permitting Defendant CLARK to avoid appearing
before a court of the State of Utah to answer for his delicts.
Defendant CLARK's contention that this action
should be dismissed in the lower court, if adopted, would
totally invalidate the statutes of the State of Utah with

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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respect to limitation of actions.

CL/\.RK' s contentio" .
"ls
that there is an automatic one-yc';ir statute of lirn 1· t· t'
·

a lee'

upon any cause of action once a cor.~pLiint has been filcc.
If service did not take place within a ,vear of fil'ing of:
cowplaint, CLARlZ contends that the action i.s invalid,
to the judgment and decision of the Utah State LegisLiturc,
which has, in many cases and in this case, provided for
limitations upon actions far in excess of the one-year
period which Defendant's contention would require the Cour
to adopt.
In vie1v of all of the foregoing, it is clear th;:\
the provision of U.R.C.P. 4(b) here applicable is proccduL)
not jurisdictional in nature.
(3)

In any event, Defendant CLARK should be

barred and eslopped from claiming that this action

should

I

be dismissed and service of process quashed, by reason of I
said Defendant's own wrongful conduct in purposely evading
service of process upon him.

CLARK should be estoµped frc:

claiming that more than one year had passed between

t~

filing of the complaint and service of process upon him.
POI8T II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DEI~YidG
DEFENDANT'S "MOTIOH TO QUASH SERVICE OF
PROCESS AND TO ORDER DIS11ISSAL OF
COMPLAINT AND FIRST AME;:-.JDED COMPLAINT"
FOR THE REASO~ THAT DEFENDA~T PAT CLARK
VOLU8TARILY SUBmTTED HIMSELF TO THE
JURISDICTION OF TiIB COURTS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE RiNlJirlliD
TO ANSWER THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.
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..

Defendant CLARK asserts that he appeared before
the courts of the State of Utah solely for the purpose of
contesting jurisdiction.

Such statement would be true if

there had been filed solely a motion to quash.

The only

prop2r remedy available where a special appearance is sought
to be made is a motion to quash.

Defendant CLARK did not

choose to make a special appearance before the lower court
solely to contest the jurisdiction of said Court, but went
further, made a general appearance, and sought to have the
entire action dismissed, including the complaint and first
amended complaint, which is relief much more extensive than
simple quashal of process.
CLL\RK's filing of his "Motion to Quash Service of
Process and to Order Dismissal of Complaint and First Amended
Complaint" constituted a general appearance which submitted
CLARK to the general jurisdiction of the trial court for all
purposes.

In the case of Barnato v. Second Judicial District

Court, 353 P.2d 1103 (Nev. 1960), the

~evada

Supreme Court

considered whether or not the filing of a motion to dismiss
constituted a general appearance.

~evada

has adopted the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with some modifications,
as has Utah.

Under wording almost exactly that of the Utah

rules, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the defendant wife's
filing of a motion to dismiss because of lack of jurisdiction
over her person, lack of sufficiency of process, and insufficiency
of service of process, constituted a general appearance
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involving the general jurisdiction of the tri;1l court,
did not constitute a special appearance.
Utah has specifically recognized and hdd Lil:i~.

i

filing of a motion to dismiss constiLutcs a ,0,cner•l
~
ap,,J; I

I

since such a motion invokes the power of the court to t;r,:.:i
relief on other than jurisdictional grounds.

Sec Ric~.3__';~,

Wade, 97 Utah 402, 93 P.2d 479 (1935), involving a divorc.
action in which a non-resident d'-'fenc.Lrnl, after having L
served with process outside of Utah, movc.:<l to quasi1

I
!

s~rvic,I

of process but at the same time requested a dismissal of;
cause, thereby entering a general c.ppearancc and submitc:r.

Af,!

himself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of Lhc court.
see Clawson v. Boston Acme ;--!ines

Dcvel~_!l~C:.12~-~~~Pa!11.·

72 Utah 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A. L. R. 1318.

The facts inc:. ·

case are very sfr1ilar to those involved in
Here, CLARK

\''JS

l

_[Zick~,

served outside the State of Utah.

a motion to quash, and also to dismiss.

I

abo•.rc.

He fiLI

The motion to

dismiss is an invocation of the gener;il jurisdiction

o[

tc·.\

courts of the State of Utah, and CLARK has therefore vul·J.: .. I
entered an appearance before the same.

Such being the ca;,

the trial court did not err in overruling and denying WX'.
I

I
I

motion to dismiss.
POINT III
IN THE EVt:NT THIS COURT REVERSES THE TRIAL
COURT AND ORDERS THE CASE REMANDED FOR
DIS1\ISSAL, THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE THAT
SUCH DISMISSAL BE WITHOUT PREJUDIO:.
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U.R.C.P. 4(b) cannot be construed to be a courtadopted provision negating the statutes of limitations
passed by the Utah State Legislature.

Defendant's contention

is that the entire matter should be dismissed.

If it is

dismissed, such dismissal should be without prejudice, and
Plaintiff should be specifically permitted to refile and
reserve Defendant, because a ruling in the nature of a
dismissal with prejudice would, in effect, negate the statutes
of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's various causes of
action.

Further, U.C.A. 78-12-LfO (1953, as amended) states:
"If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited
either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if
he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure."
The Utah State Legislature having expressed its

policy that actions which do not fail upon the merits should
not be barred, this Court should affirm the trial court's
order, but failing that, should remand the case to the trial
court for dismissal without prejudice, in order to allow
Plaintiff to refile the action, and reserve Defendant CLARK.
co;'1CLUSION
This Court should affirm the ruling of the trial
court, and remand this matter to the District Court for
further proceedings.

However, in the event that this Court
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reverses the ruling of the trial cuurL, the matter should
rernunded to the trial court for a dismissal without preju:
DATED:

1 August 1977.
Rcspcctfull/ submitted,

HORt.At;~
By

j/f

i~lJJZi.~l, __(\_.i~~

-C Attorneys for l!lairiilli
und Respo11dent ·
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